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Standard crossnational measures of corruption draw on information collected through surveys.  We 
propose a novel alternative measure based on objective data, namely, the difference between a 
measure of the physical quantities of public infrastructure and a measure of the value of public capital 
stocks.  Where the difference between the value of existing infrastructure and the actual physical 
infrastructure is larger, more money is being siphoned off in mismanagement, fraud, bribes, kickbacks, 
and embezzlement; that is, corruption is greater.  We create this measure for Italy's 20 regions as of 
the mid-1990s, controlling for possible regional differences in the costs of public construction. 
  We analyze data over the Italian regions to demonstrate the utility of the proposed measure.  
The analysis shows that corruption is greater in the southern Italian regions, as would be expected.  
Our proposed measure exhibits a strong statistically significant relationship inverse with Putnam's 
measure of government performance, suggesting that as corruption increases, government 
performance deteriorates.  Finally, we show that high-level political malfeasance￿measured by the 
number of charges of malfeasance against members of Italy's Chamber of Deputies in the period from 
1992 to 1994￿is highly and significantly correlated with the more general measure of corruption that 
we propose. 
  We offer suggestions for constructing a similar measure of corruption for various other 
countries.   2
The emergence of the Transparency International (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index in the 
1990s has fundamentally altered comparative research into corruption, typically defined as the misuse 
of public office for private gain.  The TI index, itself based on an aggregation of multiple surveys of 
public and expert opinion, currently offers scores for nearly 100 of the world's countries on an annual 
basis.
1  The availability of a comparable index for so many countries has generated a raft of 
crossnational statistical studies on the causes and the consequences of corruption (including Mauro 
1995; Mauro 1997; Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000; Treisman 2000). Results of this line of analysis 
have been impressive, demonstrating, for instance, that corruption lowers investment and economic 
growth.   It has reinvigorated research into a set of questions that political scientists had temporarily 
abandoned, in part because of he lack of good data, regarding the quality of government.
2   Finally, 
research based on the Corruption Perceptions Index has also had significant policy importance 
Nonetheless, the measure of corruption commonly used has some intrinsic weaknesses, 
weaknesses that may have become increasingly problematic over time.  These are of two sorts.  First, 
the real degree of reliability of survey information about corruption is largely unknown.  Respondents 
directly involved in corruption may have incentives to underreport such involvement, and those not 
involved may not have accurate information.  This is an intrinsic weakness to measuring corruption 
with survey information, a weakness that TI attempts to correct by aggregating information from 
multiple surveys.  Second, however, aggregation efforts may be less successful in some cases than 
                                                                 
1  For details, see http://www.transparency.org.  In 2001, for the first time, the TI index drew on 
surveys only of businesspeople and on country experts, and did not use any surveys of public opinion 
(reported in Lambsdorff 2001a).   3
others.  As TI notes, for 2001, the Corruption Perceptions index "is a composite index, drawing on 
14 different polls and surveys from seven independent institutions carried out among business people 
and country analysts, including surveys of residents, both local and expatriate" (TI 2001).
3   For 
countries where information from as many as 14 surveys is available, the scoring is likely to be more 
reliable than countries scored on the basis of the minimum number of available surveys (for 2001, this 
was three).  This is likely to generate systematic biases in the TI dataset, for instance making the index 
more reliable for developed nations than for less developed.  In other words, the Corruption 
Perceptions Index is more reliable precisely where corruption is typically less prevalent.
4 
The reliability of the Corruption Perceptions Index may also deteriorate over time.  As the 
index has become more widely publicized, there is a real danger that survey respondents, rather than 
reporting how much corruption they have actually observed and/or participated in, are instead 
responding  to the amount of corruption reported by the most recent TI index.  This is a specific 
example of the more general problem that respondents may "not report their personal experiences but 
rely on media coverage and reports obtained by others" (Lambsdorff 2001a). To the extent that the 
substantial publicity generated by the index itself actually entails greater enforcement of anticorruption 
laws, or greater domestic press attention to purportedly corrupt transactions, the index itself may 
actually generate an  increase in the amount of corruption known to the public, as well as to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                             
2  Examples of older political science research into corruption, which was seen as especially 
troublesome in developing nations, include Banfield 1975, Huntington 1968, Nye 1967, and Scott 1972. 
3  The 2001 index drew on surveys from the following sources: Political and Economic Risk 
Consultancy, Hong Kong; the World Economic Forum; the Institute for Management Development, 
Lausanne; PricewaterhouseCoopers; the World Bank's World Business Environment Survey; the 
Economic Intelligence Unit; and Freedom House, Nations in Transit (Lambsdorff 2001a).   
4  For a general discussion of the reliability of the TI index, see Lambsdorff (2001b).   4
businesspeople and to country experts.  The construction of the index, in other words, may well 
become self-referential, and the measures may become endogenous to the index itself.   
In response to some of these concerns, scholars at the World Bank developed an alternate 
index, one that, like the TI index, aggregates information from multiple surveys but  weights each 
according to its presumed reliability rather than simply  standardizing them.  The World Bank's 
weighting procedure is based on the premise that surveys whose values better correlate with others 
for the same country are of higher quality (see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón 1999a; 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón  1999b).  The development of an alternate index reveals 
underlying dissatisfaction with some aspects of using survey data to measure corruption in the first 
place, as well as specific disagreement with TI's aggregation procedure. 
  Like scholars at the World Bank, we endorse the attempt to develop multiple measures of the 
same concept by using different kinds of measurement techniques.  Basing a measure of corruption on 
survey information has inherent limitations, ones recognized even by those involved in their creation 
and dissemination.  Respondents not directly involved in corrupt transactions may be unreliable in the 
information they report, whereas those involved in such activities may underreport them.   
Complementary measures using other information are obviously called for. 
In this study, we propose an entirely novel, more “objective” measure of corruption: namely, 
the difference between what government cumulatively spends on public infrastructure and the physical 
quantities of infrastructure that are available (controlling for local variations in the cost differences in 
infrastructure construction).  The intuition underlying this measure is that, all else equal, governments 
that don't get what they pay for are those whose bureaucrats and politicians are siphoning off more   5
public monies in corrupt transactions.
5  The rationale for focusing on spending on public infrastructure 
is that activities surrounding public works construction are a classic locus of illegal monetary activities 
between public officials (both elected and appointed) and businesses; indeed, as Rose-Ackerman 
notes, “Corruption in contracting occurs in every country” (1999, p. 28) and as a result, “high levels 
of corruption are associated with higher levels of public investment as a share of GDP” (ibid., p. 30). 
 We interpret public infrastructure that costs more than the national average￿a level we take 
as a rough benchmark￿as indicating waste, fraud, and mismanagement in the public contracting 
process.   While our measure does not allow us to distinguish mere waste and mismanagement from 
outright fraud and other illegal monetary transactions that entail corruption in the construction of public 
works, we subject our measure to some external validity checks that show that it stands up well.  We 
hence conclude that the proposed measure does a good job capturing the varying extent of corruption 
across the Italian peninsula. 
While in principle, it is feasible to collect the relevant data crossnationally￿and below, we 
discuss possible data sources for selected other countries￿in what follows, we chose to demonstrate 
the utility of our proposed proxy with an analysis of Italian regions.  The main rationale for focusing 
initially on a single country is that we know enough about real differences in the costs of constructing 
public works across Italy's twenty regions to be able to incorporate the appropriate controls into the 
analysis; moreover, some differences in the costs of constructing public works may not exist within a 
given national territory but would have to be confronted in building a crossnational database.  In 
                                                                 
5  Our measure, like that generated by the TI index, is not able to distinguish political from 
bureaucratic corruption, nor what Rose-Ackerman (1978) has called "high-level" from low-level, or petty   6
addition, by working within a single country that we know well, we feel confident that we can interpret 
the results accurately, given the wealth of independent information that exists on the political and 
economic differences among Italian regions (for instance, Kohn 1999; Putnam 1993).  Italy is a 
country with especially well-known, deeply-rooted, and long-standing regional differences, and we 
are able to exploit some of the available information on these in order to assess our measure.  Indeed, 
we explicitly compare our measure with other data on Italian regions, as a way to evaluate its validity.  
Our analysis is in principle easily extended to crossnational analysis, given appropriate data and 
country expertise.   
We proceed in five steps.  First, we discuss the measure of corruption that we propose, with 
details on the data and the method used to construct the measure. Second, we detail the control 
variables that we have incorporated.  Third, we present the results of comparing data on public 
spending and existing infrastructure over the 20 Italian regions; that is, we present the index that we 
generate, both numerically and with a map.  Fourth, we compare our results with other types of data 
available for Italy's regions, in order to assess the validity of our measure.  In conclusion, we discuss 
possible extensions of the procedure proposed here to other countries. 
 
The Data and Indicator Construction 
Our procedure is to create two sets of measures of public capital stock using two different 
types of data.  The measure of "corruption" that we propose is based on the ratio between the two.  
The first consists of a measure of existing physical infrastructure, based on an infrastructure census, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                             
corruption.   7
whereas the second is a measure of gross capital stock, assembled using what is called the perpetual 
inventory method (PIM), a standard method for calculating capital assets.
6  The measure of physical 
infrastructure uses data collection devices devised by the European Union (Biehl 1986; Commission 
1986) to assess infrastructure needs across the terrain of its member states (see Ecoter 1999), 
whereas the second uses standard econometric techniques employed by governments around the 
world (see OECD 2000).  We emphasize that both sets of data are based on commonly accepted 
measurement techniques.  We might think of the first as a measure an engineer would be comfortable 
with, whereas the second is one familiar to economists.  The novelty of our work lies with the idea of 
comparing them to create an index of "corruption."  We now describe each measure and the 
underlying data. 
 
Physical Public Capital Data 
In Ecoter (2000), a computation of Italian provincial public capital stocks is presented.  In 
essence, the authors collect data on the physical amounts of various types of public capital that exist in 
a given year
7 for the 103 Italian provinces, using a wealth of statistical sources. For example, roads 
are measured as kilometers of roads; railroads are, likewise, kilometers of railroads; hospitals are the 
number of beds in public hospitals; and schools are measured by the number of classrooms.  
Having collected these disparate measures of physical public infrastructure in obviously 
                                                                 
6  The first uses data from Ecoter (2000), based on earlier studies by Mazziotta (2000) and by  
Biehl et al. (1990), while the second uses data compiled by Bonaglia and Picci (2000), based on data 
from Picci (1995), using methods outlined in OECD (2000). 
7  We use data from 1997.   8
variable units, the authors face aggregation problems. Within each category of goods, they solve this 
by constructing reasonable weights. For example, freeways are weighted more than country roads.  
More importantly, across the various categories of goods there is an aggregation problem in order to 
generate a single overall measure.  This is addressed at length in Mazziotta (2000), who shows how 
the choice of a particular aggregation method, up to a point, does not substantially alter the results.  
The basic procedure is to standardize the various measures across types of goods, weight them, and 
then aggregate them. 
Normalization is carried out in two different ways.  Goods that are "space serving," such as 
roads and railroads, are normalized by the area of the geographical unit that they refer to, whereas 
goods that are "people serving," such as public buildings, are normalized by population. The resulting 
measures are then expressed as ratios to the national average and multiplied by one hundred, so that a 
measure, say, of 124 means that a given territorial unit has 24 percent more infrastructure than the 
national average, after having controlled for size and population.  
  Ecoter (2000) presents provincial and regional indices for the year 1997. The regional data 
are shown in the leftmost column of Table 1. The data show that northern regions, which are located 
in the top portion of the list, are more infrastructure-abundant than regions in the south of Italy, which 
are featured in the bottom half of the list. For instance, the southern region of Calabria has a little 
more than half the stock of (normalized) infrastructure than the national average, while Emilia-
Romagna, located in the north, has over 40 percent more than the average, or almost three times as 
much as Calabria.  At the regional level, there is thus considerable variation in the extent of physical 
infrastructure that exists in Italy.     9
Table 1 about here 
 
Public Capital Stocks Computed using the Perpetual Inventory Method 
Drawing on Bonaglia and Picci (2000), we now describe the sources and methods for the 
construction of the measure of capital stocks using the perpetual inventory method.  This is the most 
common way that statistical agencies measure public capital stock.  Essentially, it involves adding up 
past capital formation in constant prices while deducing the value of assets as they reach the end of 
their service lives. 
In order to do that for Italian regions, we tap two main data sources.  Rossi, Sorgato, and 
Toniolo (1993, RST from now on), draw on several statistical sources to create one long time series 
(covering the years 1890 to 1992) of public investments at the national level for Italy. We have then 
used data from ISTAT (1999) to extend RST for the years from 1992 to 1998.  
Typically, to obtain estimates of current capital stock, one needs estimates of previous capital 
formation, beginning with an initial benchmark estimate.  The latter may draw on information such as 
that contained in a census or administrative property records. If one is not interested in the early 
decades of the sample period, the RST data allow computation of the total stock at the national level 
by means of a perpetual inventory technique even when an initial benchmark is not available. This is 
possible since after their service lives, goods are retired from the capital stock, so that after a certain 
number of years, an initial estimate is no longer necessary.  
To obtain similar data on capital stocks at the regional level, information contained in ISTAT 
(1954-1998) has been used. ISTAT collects regional data by means of an annual survey of relevant   10
public officials, in order to record the amount of public investments for geographic area, type of good, 
and administrative unit responsible for its realization and for its financing. The analysis covers "all 
public works related to new construction, reconstruction, structural improvements, major repairs, 
special maintenance, and similar interventions, financed a) with total financing by the State or with its 
contribution, through Ministries and by means of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno;
8 b) with total or partial 
financing by national or territorial branches of the Public Administration (Inail,
9 Inps,
10 Regions, 
Provinces, Municipalities) or with the contribution of other administrative units (the national State 
excluded); c) with total financing by the Autonomous Administrations of the State and by other public 
corporations" (ISTAT (1954-1998)). (For details on the data, see Appendix B.) 
There are nine types of goods included in the analysis. These are: roads and airports; railroads 
and subways; marine (ports, lake and river navigation); water (river planning, etc.) and electrical lines; 
public buildings and schools; sanitation and public health (hospitals, water filtering, sewers); land 
reclamation and  irrigation; telecommunications; and other types of works (such as pipelines, 
infrastructure for tourism, etc.).  
We first use the survey data from ISTAT (1954-1998) to apportion the aggregate data from 
RST to regions and types of goods.  After doing so, we have 180 long time series￿one for each 
region and one for each type of good￿whose reciprocal ratios are the same as the reciprocal ratios 
                                                                 
8  The Cassa per il Mezzorgiorno, which no longer e xists, was a special form of financing, 
established by the national government, aimed at encouraging economic development in the south of 
Italy. 
9  Istituto Nazionale per l'Assicurazione Contro gli Infortuni sul Lavoro, a social security body 
covering certain classes of employees. 
10  Istituto Nazionale di Previdenza Sociale, the main national social security body.   11
of the ISTAT data, and whose grand sum is equal to the aggregate data in RST. 
These long time series can then be used to compute the regional public capital stocks using a 
perpetual inventory technique that is applied to each of them; that is, to the nine categories of public 
goods for each of the twenty regions.  
Indices for infrastructure can be computed in a way similar to that for the physical data, by 
normalizing space and people serving goods appropriately. While it is impossible to precisely replicate 
the methodology used in Ecoter (2000) for the physical data, for the simple reason that the two 
datasets are characterized by similar but not  identical categories of goods, care has been taken to 
make the two indices as comparable as possible.  (Details of the procedure used appear in Appendix 
B.)  The results are shown in the second column of Table 1.  
This second measure of public capital generates data that is quite different from the physical 
data examined above; in particular, southern Italy is, on average, better equipped than the north, 
according to this second measure.  This is the opposite of what we found using the physical 
infrastructure measure, and on the face of it, rather surprising.  Our proposed measure of corruption 
provides an interpretation for why public expenditures for infrastructure in Italy's south are so much 
higher than one would expect. 
A noteworthy exception in the measure presented in Column 2 of Table 1 is the northern 
region of Liguria, whose infrastructure, after controlling for space and population, is 2.36 times the 
national average.  This makes the region an outlier, especially among the northern regions.   However, 
Liguria is a special case, because the area houses a large population on a very narrow wedge of land 
running between mountains and sea. In such a situation, public works construction often requires   12
daunting￿and expensive￿techniques, familiar to anyone who has driven the freeway running along 
the Ligurian coast. (See below, Figure 1, to visualize the location of the region.) In what follows, we 
first include controls  for regional variations in altitude to try to capture the Ligurian case, and then in 
our preferred set of results simply exclude Liguria from the sample entirely. 
 
Cost Controls 
Several factors may affect the cost of a given public work. Casual observation suggests that in 
Italy, the costs of infrastructure construction should be largely similar in different parts of the country.  
First, labor market regulation forces labor costs to be almost identical nationwide. Second, the 
presence of an extensive and quite efficient transportation network guarantees effective arbitrage of 
many building materials, and the construction industry, unlike some other industries, is present in all 
parts of Italy, the fruit of a tradition dating back to the Romans.  Hence, we have no reason to believe 
that public infrastructure should exhibit large cost variations across the country. 
Notwithstanding these considerations, we developed a measure of regional cost differentials, 
in order to be as certain as possible that the differences we observe in the regional data on physical 
infrastructure compared with public capital stocks did not stem from differences in costs at the 
regional level.  We tapped several data sources to create different kinds of cost controls. The July 
2001 issue of an Italian journal, Ponte, contains provincial data
11 on labor costs in the construction 
industry, including annual updates with information  from the industry’s national labor contract, which 
                                                                 
11  Provinces are geographic units smaller than regions; data at the provincial level is easily 
aggregated into regional data.   13
sets wage increases for different categories of workers in construction.  Such data confirm that labor 
costs are very similar across the Italian provinces and regions. We have used the data on skilled labor 
(primo livello) to build a regional index of construction wages, whose average we have set at 100.  
Second, the regional offices of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transportation collect a 
wealth of data on the costs of construction materials at the regional and provincial levels in two month 
intervals. According to Ministry officials whom we interviewed for the purpose of assessing the quality 
of these data, their purpose is to record temporal variations more than geographic ones; that is, 
government officials are mainly concerned with assessing price inflation in the costs of basic materials 
used in construction. We thus decided to consider the cost only of cement and of sand since, 
according to the interviews, these goods' prices are better measured, and their tradability is also 
geographically limited; that is, we would expect the greatest potential geographic cost variation in 
these components.
12 
We then constructed an aggregate regional cost index, based on data from January 2001,  as 
a geometric average of the labor, sand and cement indices. According to the overall cost index, the 
least costly region, Lazio, has construction costs around 7 percent below the national average, while 
Tuscany is the most expensive region, with costs 12 percent above the national average. Such a cost 
measure was used to scale the perpetual inventory capital stock data from 1997, assuming that, while 
it refers to only one moment in time, the cost differences across regions were essentially unchanged 
                                                                 
12  Data on the regional costs of construction materials proved difficult to obtain because the 
national Ministry in Rome does not collect them (sic), and as a result we had to contact the twenty 
regional offices individually.   We were not able to collect the cost data for Liguria, Abruzzo, Sicily, and 
Calabria. Neighboring region's data have been used for those cases.     14
over those years. Such an assumption is obviously strong but unavoidable, given the sheer difficulty in 
finding comparable cost information for other years.   
The cost-corrected perpetual inventory index is shown in the third column of Table 1. As 
expected, the data are not much different from the raw data displayed in column 2.
13 But controlling 
for what cost differences may exist across Italy's regions has the obvious advantage of generating a 
measure with greater validity and reliability. 
  Other variables in addition to labor and materials could potentially affect the costs of 
infrastructure development. However, these variables seem to us somewhat less obvious than labor 
and materials, and as a result, we choose to test their importance rather than assume they were 
important and fold them into our proposed measure.   
  Among the additional variables we considered are differences in the altitude at which 
construction occurs and differences in population density. An example should clarify the possible 
importance of the former.  A freeway crossing a range of mountains is more expensive to build than a 
freeway across a plain, simply because of the corresponding differences in terrain. To capture this 
effect, we used a dataset provided by ISTAT containing communal data￿communes are a smaller 
administrative subdivision, below provinces￿on surface, population, and highest and lowest altitude. 
For each commune, we computed the difference between the lowest and highest altitude, excluding 
altitudes above 1000 meters in order to limit the influence of (relatively unpopulated) mountains, and 
we aggregated the data at the regional level by weighting the municipal data by their population. 
                                                                 
13   In fact, the correlation coefficient between the two measures is 0.995.   15
  We used the same dataset to compute a measure of population density, to capture any effect 
that congestion may have on the cost of public works. The underlying intuition is that it is more 
expensive to build new roads, for instance, in areas that are already densely populated than in areas 
that are relatively less populated.  We experimented with several measure, and in the end we chose 
the ratio of regional population living in cities with more than 30,000 inhabitants as our control
14. 
  We also experimented with a measure of seismicity, since government standards for the 
construction of public  works are more stringent in areas of the country more susceptible to 
earthquakes.  We computed this as a population-weighted aggregation of the standard seismicity 
index (Istituto Sismico Nazionale 2001) at the municipal level. However, results were not very 
meaningful, so we decided not to include such a measure.  In the end, therefore, we adjust our 
regional measure of public capital stocks with four cost controls:  
•  construction wages; 
•  basic construction materials; 
•  altitude; 
•  population density. 
The first t wo were folded into our regional index.  The second two were used as controls in 
regressions, the results of which we report below, and proved relatively unimportant substantively. 
 
Results 
                                                                 
14   This measure is obviously sensitive to the particularities of Italian population distribution, and 
would have to be altered accordingly for other countries.   16
We first compute the ratio at the regional level between the physical index and the cost-
corrected perpetual inventory index. Such a ratio is shown in column 4 of Table 1, and it represents 
the differences between the two ways of estimating public goods, correcting for the two differences in 
cost (labor and materials) that we have discussed. A value equal to 1 means that a given region has 
the same allotment of infrastructure regardless of which of the two measures￿physical infrastructure 
and spending￿is used.  It also means that that region is as effective in turning money into public 
works as the national average. A value equal to 1.5 means that a given region has 50 percent more 
physical capital than the amount of money spent over time would lead one to expect, relative to the 
national average.  For example, Sicily, with a ratio equal to 0.56, has a little over 50 percent of the 
physical capital that it would have if the financial resources that were spent there had been spent 
according to the nationally average standard. The data demonstrates impressive differences across 
Italy's regions. 
This ratio is now used as the dependent variable in a regression analysis, whose model also 
includes the two additional variables that we have considered above:  variations in altitude, and 
population concentration. Table 2 shows the regression output, with a dummy variable included for 
Liguria.  
Table 2 about here 
 
We first note that both the altitude and the population density variables have the expected 
negative signs: the greater the altitude variation or the greater the density, the more expensive it is to 
build, and the smaller the difference between the physical and the permanent inventory indices.   17
However, the differences are not significant. The Liguria dummy variable is not significant either, but 
its estimated coefficient also has the expected negative sign. Overall, the regression explains only 8 
percent of total variation, indicating that the cost variables cannot explain the bulk of the huge 
differences between the two indices. 
In Table 2a we present the same regression with the exclusion of the Liguria dummy variable. 
The regression now explains 4 percent of total variation; even if the Liguria dummy variable is not 
significant in the original model, we think it should be retained, since these results suggest that our 
altitude variation variable is not able to fully capture the extreme nature of Ligurian geography. 
Table 2a about here 
 
In Table 3, we take the residuals of the regressions reported in Table 2 and we add 1 to them, 
in order to obtain a version of the dependent variable, our proposed measure of corruption, from 
which we have purged possible differences in the costs of construction. This formulation is the 
measure of corruption that we propose.  It is similar to the dependent variable of the regression 
(reported in  the fourth column of Table 1), since the additional control variables for altitude and 
population have so little explanatory power.   In Figure 1, we illustrate our measure of corruption by 
mapping the variable across Italy's 20 regions.  
Figure 1 about here 
 
Our interpretation of the corruption measure is straightforward. Consider Trentino Alto-
Adige, whose "corruption index," at 1.69, is the highest in the country. This means that in Trentino,   18
there is 69 percent more public infrastructure than would be the case if the public goods constructed 
had cost the national average. Consider now Calabria, the most corrupt region by our measure, with 
an index equal to 0.18.  Infrastructure there is only 18 percent of what it would be if resources had 
been used at the same extent as the national average. These differences are staggeringly large. Note in 
particular that all the southern regions, with the exception  of the island of Sardinia, report numbers 
below 1, meaning that in every one of Italy's southern regions, public authorities have gotten less than 
the national average for their spending on public infrastructure. Also note that Calabria, Campania and 
Sicily, typically regarded as those regions most affected by organized crime, are the three worst 
performing regions, according to our measure. On the other hand, the northern "civic-minded" regions, 
those characterized by large amounts of "social capital" (Putnam 1993) are the ones that exhibit the 
least corruption. 
Table 3a, finally, reports the corruption index with Liguria included in the sample. The 
differences with respect to Table 3 are minor. 
Table 3a about here 
 
Tests of Validity 
It is commonly believed that corruption is higher in Italy's southern regions compared with their 
northern counterparts (cf. Banfield 1958).  Our proposed method for measuring corruption  thus 
generates values that are intuitively plausible, because our index has lower (more corrupt) numbers for 
the south of the country.  We can go one step further, however, and compare our measure with other 
variables for which we have regional level data and about which we have relatively secure knowledge.    19
In this section, we present results of regressions of our proposed measure against Putnam's measure 
of governmental performance and against newly-available data measuring high-level political 
malfeasance.  
In Putnam (1993), the author presents an index of institutional performance for Italy's 20 
regions, for the period 1978-1985.  The components of Putnam's index, described in detail there, are 
as follows: 
•  reform legislation; 
•  day care centers; 
•  housing and urban development; 
•  statistical and information services; 
•  legislative innovation; 
•  cabinet stability; 
•  family clinics; 
•  bureaucratic responsiveness; 
•  industrial policy instruments; 
•  budget promptness; 
•  local health unit ing; 
•  agricultural spending capacity (Putnam 1993: table 3.2, p. 75). 
We have itemized the components to verify that Putnam's index of governmental performance 
does not contain anything like a measure of corruption, and hence is independent of what we seek to 
measure here.  The correlation coefficient between the two indices is 0.795, and it is highly significant,   20
suggesting that where corruption is least￿recall that our measure has lower numbers for higher levels 
of corruption￿ government performance is best. 
The first row of Table 4 reports the estimated correlation coefficients between our proposed 
measure of corruption and Putnam's index of government performance, together with its significance 
level.  Our hypothesis is that where government is unable to prevent waste, fraud, mismanagement and 
other aspects of corruption from occurring in the construction of public works, it is likely to be 
generally less effective in its capacity to govern.   The statistical results do not reject this interpretation. 
Our proposed measure of corruption accounts for 68 percent of the variation in the performance 
measure, corresponding to a correlation coefficient of 0.824, and is statistically significant well below 
the 1% level.   
Table 4 about here 
 
We next assess the proposed index of corruption against a measure of high-level political 
malfeasance. This measure counts the number of members of parliament (MPs) charged w ith 
malfeasance in Italy's XI Legislature (1992-94) for all crimes excluding those such as libel, slander, 
and likewise.
15  The count is performed over the twenty regions, and the number of those charged is 
put in proportion to the number elected from each region.
16  Hence, the measure used is the percent 
                                                                 
15  For other work using this measure, but only examining Christian Democratic members of 
Parliament, see Golden and Chang (2001). 
16  Italian elections to the Chamber of Deputies in the period considered took place in electoral 
districts that were smaller than regions.  Because our proposed measure of corruption is available only 
for regions, however, we aggregated the data on charges of malfeasance by electoral district into 
regions. Note however that no charge was made against the only MP of Valle d'Aosta, so we excluded 
that region.   21
of Deputies charged with non-opinion crimes during the life of the legislature.
17  This measure is 
conceptually different than that proposed here, because it concerns illegal activities of all sorts by 
legislators, not bribes and kickbacks in public works construction. 
The second row of Table 4 reports the correlation coefficients of our proposed measure of 
corruption with the Golden-Chang measure of charges of political malfeasance. Our hypothesis is that 
those regions whose national elected representatives are purportedly more involved in illegal activities 
of various sorts are also likely to be those regions in which national legislators have implicitly permitted 
or even explicitly encouraged greater numbers of  bribes, payoffs, and kickbacks surrounding the 
procurement process for public works.  
The estimated correlation is equal to -0.662, meaning that around 44 percent of total variation 
in our proposed measure of corruption is accounted for by the extent  of purported political 
malfeasance characteristic of the legislators representing the region.
18  Our proposed measure exhibits 
the correct sign￿it is negatively associated with purported legislative malfeasance, as we would 
expect given that lower numbers of our measure indicate greater corruption, whereas the reverse is 
the case for the legislative measure.  The coefficient is strongly significantly associated with the 
outcome.   
These correlation analysis results are just what we would expect if our proposed measure 
                                                                 
17  Because some legislators were charged more than once, the percent could be higher than 100. 
18  For this analysis, data on charges of malfeasance for non-opinion crimes had to be aggregated at 
the regional level.  Part of the region of Lazio comprises provinces from two different electoral districts.  
The results reported thus reflect this.  The number of MPs charged from the electoral district that cuts 
across two regions is only one, however, so the unavoidable error in the analysis is very small and does 
not substantially affect the results we report.   22
were doing a good job capturing the extent of bribes, kickbacks, and payoffs in public works across 
the Italian regions.  Before concluding, we comment on the temporal discrepancies across the various 
measures.  The measure of government performance that we take from Putnam draws on data from 
the period 1978-1985, whereas the charges of malfeasance against legislators that we examine refers 
to the 1992-94 period.  Our proposed measure of corruption, finally, uses data on physical 
infrastructure f rom 1997.  Our justification for the temporal discrepancy between the performance 
measure and our proposed measure is twofold.  First, we do not have comparable data on 
government performance for a period closer to that for which we have the infrastructure measure.  
Second, however, we do not believe that the index of government performance across Italy’s regions 
is likely to have altered much in the intervening ten or fifteen years; certainly, the performance of the 
various regions relative to each other, which is what we care about, is not likely to have changed 
much.    
It is easy to justify the temporal lag between the charges of malfeasance against legislators that 
we examine and the extent of corruption in public works spending.  The XI Legislature was the last 
under Italy’s old electoral system, one that systematically encouraged high-level political corruption 
(Golden and Chang 2001; Golden forthcoming).  After 1994, the institutional conditions systematically 
promoting corruption declined, and as a result, it does not make sense to use data on purported 
political malfeasance from subsequent legislatures.  Moreover, the proposed measure of corruption 
that we devise is unlikely to have altered much between the early and the late 1990s, because public 
infrastructure changes slowly. 
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Conclusions 
The measure we propose can be constructed for other countries, although doing so will be 
painstaking.
19  Data on public capital stocks exist for most countries, and can be assembled relatively 
easily by persons familiar with them.  Data on physical infrastructure are much more difficult to collect, 
standardize, and aggregate.   For the other main member states of the European Union￿France, 
Germany, the United Kingdom and Spain￿data compatible with those that we have presented here 
for Italy exist at the regional level (what is called NUTS 2) (Ecoter 1999).  Hence, for those 
countries, it would be relatively easy to assemble measures of corruption similar to that proposed 
here; all that would be needed, in addition, would be the country expertise to collect various types of 
potentially relevant cost controls.  For Latin America, as well as countries in various other regions, 
some data on physical infrastructure is available from the World Bank (World Bank 1999), including 
recent data on kilometers of  paved roads, number of hospital beds, and various others.  What is 
gained in availability of data across countries is lost in the precision of data within countries; these data 
exist for many countries, but are highly incomplete.  Nonetheless, with sufficient country expertise, 
they would be a starting point for assembling crossnational measures of corruption that drew on 
objective sources of data rather than surveys.   
 
                                                                 
19  An international team with multinational funding would probably be required to do so 
expeditiously.    24
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(col. 1/col. 3) 
PI   118.4 64.0 64.9 1.8230
 VA  132.6 73.0 74.1 1.7895
LO  118.4 110.8             107.5 1.1015
TA  122.9 66.1 63.3 1.9405
VE  115.3 92.0 93.1 1.2379
FR  125.5 111.1 114.7 1.0945
LI  127.3 236.3 235.5 0.5406
EM  144.1 94.2 86.8 1.6593
 TO  112.8 74.3 66.2 1.7049
 UM   109 57.7 57.2 1.9040
 MA  109.7 83.3 84.5 1.2981
LA  111.3 130.7 140.5 0.7922
AB  92.3 83.9 85.3 1.0818
MO  62.1 75.7 77.1 0.8051
CM  51.1 150.5 157.8 0.3238
PU  63.3 85.0 88.8 0.7127
BA  70 96.0 97.2 0.7199
CL  50.3 121.1 125.5 0.4008
SI  66.1 111.9 117.5 0.5626
SA  66.5 51.2 47.4 1.4040
 
Note:  For regional abbreviations, see Appendix A.   29
 
 
Table 2. Regression Output, Corruption Measure with Additional Controls 
 
Dependent Variable: Column 4 of Table 1 
Included observations: 20 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic  Prob.  
C  1.353089  0.456152 2.966314  0.0091 
Dummy Liguria  -0.561016  0.642474 -0.873212  0.3955 
Altitude Variation  -0.010263  0.305222 -0.033624  0.9736 
Pop. Concentration  -0.418331  1.120161 -0.373456  0.7137 
R-squared  0.082371     Mean dependent var  1.144853 
Adjusted R-squared  -0.089684     S.D. dependent var  0.528650 
S.E. of regression  0.551847     Akaike info criterion  1.825764 
Sum squared resid  4.872557     Schwarz criterion  2.024910 
Log likelihood  -14.25764     F-statistic  0.478749 
Durbin-Watson stat  0.736249     Prob(F-statistic)  0.701557   30
Table 2A.  Regression Output, Corruption Measure with Additional Controls,  
Excluding Liguria 
 
Dependent Variable: Column 4 of Table 1 
Included observations: 20 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error t-Statistic  Prob.  
C  1.473151  0.431887 3.410963  0.0033 
Altitude Variation  -0.117513  0.277461 -0.423530  0.6772 
Pop. Concentration  -0.496010  1.108795 -0.447342  0.6603 
R-squared  0.038641     Mean dependent var  1.144853 
Adjusted R-squared  -0.074460     S.D. dependent var  0.528650 
S.E. of regression  0.547978     Akaike info criterion  1.772319 
Sum squared resid  5.104764     Schwarz criterion  1.921679 
Log likelihood  -14.72319     F-statistic  0.341647 
Durbin-Watson stat  0.813318     Prob(F-statistic)  0.715367 
   31
 
 
Table 3.  Proposed Corruption Measure 
  
region  ONE+RESID=corruption 
PI  1.658993 
VA   1.562387 
LO   0.910215 
TR   1.715348 
VE   1.026372 
FR   0.897277 
LI   1.000000 
EM    1.522561 
 TO    1.570402 
 UM   1.767413 
 MA    1.108461 
LA   0.749103 
AB   0.882820 
MO   0.560958 
CM   0.206093 
PU    0.581630 
BA   0.457840 
CL   0.182298 
SI    0.439347 
SA    1.200483 
 
 
Note:  For regional abbreviations, see Appendix A. 
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Table 3a.  Proposed Corruption Measure, Including Liguria 
 
 
region  ONE+RESID=corruption 
PI   1.723601 
VA   1.512756 
LO    0.899253 
TR   1.689323 
VE   1.141085 
FR   0.960856 
LI   0.586095 
EM   1.624810 
 TO    1.618104 
 UM   1.729374 
 MA   1.111404 
LA   0.828587 
AB   0.878434 
MO   0.514105 
CM   0.276311 
PU    0.623645 
BA   0.397513 
CL   0.168070 
SI   0.482516 
SA    1.234157 
 
 
Note:  For regional abbreviations, see Appendix A. 
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Table 4.  Correlation of Proposed Corruption Measure with Governmental Performance and 
Charges of High-level Legislative Malfeasance 
 
Correlation of the proposed 
measure of corruption with: 
 
Correlation:  P-Value 
Government Performance 
 
0.824  0.000 
Charges of malfeasance 
 
-0.662  0.000 
 
Sources: Data on governmental performance courtesy of Robert Putnam.   
Data on charges of malfeasance courtesy of Miriam Golden.  
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Appendix A. 
 
Regional Abbreviations Used in Tables and Figures 
 
 
AB  Abruzzi 
BA  Basilicata 
CL  Calabria 
CM  Campania 
EM  Emilia-Romagna 
FR  Friuli-Venezia Giulia 
LA  Lazio 
LI  Liguria 
LO  Lombardy 
MA  Marche 
MO  Molise 
PI  Piedmont 
PU  Puglia 
SA  Sardinia 
SI  Sicily 
TO  Tuscany 
TR  Trentino-Alto Adige 
UM  Umbria 
VA  Valle d'Aosta 
VE  Veneto 
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Appendix B.  Measures and Methods Used. 
 
The Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM) 
 
The perpetual inventory method used is the same as that traditionally adopted by ISTAT, 
Italy's national statistical agency. Capital goods are retired according to a normal distribution centered 
on the goods' mean life, such that 90 percent of goods are retired within  25 percent of the mean life. 
The distribution is truncated at 40 percent of the mean life, as in ISTAT (1995). Mean lives have been 
computed as the average of the mean lives adopted for comparable categories of goods by those 
OECD countries for which an indicator exists (Italy not among them), as recorded in OECD (1993). 
All vintages of goods before 1946 have been reduced by 8 percent in all regions to take into account 
the effects of World War II, following suggestions in Rosa and Siesto (1985).  
Sensitivity Analysis of Public Stock Estimates to Pre-1954 Data 
 
In principle, data on how the national aggregate public investment is split into regions and type 
of goods is needed for the years before 1954. However, the data used to apportion the aggregate 
data area to regions and types of goods are available only from 1954 (ISTAT, 1954-1998). The 
share of the national flow that goes to the different regions and types of goods has to be assumed for 
the missing years. We assume that the share of the national public investments before 1954 are equal 
to the average of the shares observed between 1954 and 1959.  
There are two main reasons why the capital stock estimate for 1997￿which we use to 
compute our measure of corruption￿is almost unaffected by the method we adopt for the period 
before 1954: a) most of the public works built before 1954 had already exhausted their mean lives by 
1997; and b) the flows of investment increased considerably over time, at constant prices, following   37
the economic expansion of the post-war period, giving greater substantive importance to the postwar 
era. Moreover, the physical destruction that occurred with World War II decreased the importance of 
the preexisting capital stock.  
A sensitivity analysis was carried out by assuming, for selected regions and types of goods, 
that pre -1954 investments were 1/10 of the values that we used. In all cases, the estimate for the 
corresponding stock in 1997 was less than 1 percent smaller than otherwise computed.  
Computation of the Infrastructure Index 
 
In Ecoter (2000), the general index for infrastructure for 1997 is produced by dividing 
infrastructure  into "space serving" and "population serving” goods.  "Space serving" public capital 
refers to: 
•  Roads, railroads, airports, ports, other transportation infrastructure, 
relecommunication, energy, oil and natural gas pipelines, and water supply. 
"Population serving" public capital refers to: 
•  Schools and universities, hospitals, kindergardens, sports facilities, theaters, museums, 
and libraries. 
To obtain our measure for 1997, we divide the available nine categories of capital, computed 
using the Permanent Inventory Method, as follows: 
"Space serving" public capital is: 
•  Roads and airports, marine, water and electrical lines, land reclamation and irrigation, 
telecommunications, half of all other types of works. 
"People serving" public capital is:   38
•  Public buildings and schools, sanitation and public health, half of all other types of 
goods. 
The definitions of goods are similar across the two types of data, but they are not identical. 
Note however that a) different types of infrastructure are highly correlated across regions￿that is, 
regons well equipped tend to be well equipped in all types of goods (Ecoter 2000)￿and b) that any 
discrepancy is mitigated by the fact that population and the territorial dimension are highly correlated, 
with a correlation coefficient equal to 0.71. If they were perfectly correlated, the distinction between 
"space" and "people" serving infrastructure would be irrelevant.  